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Two features of the Canadian constitutional system are commonplace,
namely, (I) that to a preponderating extent the system under which Canada is
governed is an unwritten one, and (2) that both the unwritten and written parts
of that system abound in ancient modes of expression and forms of procedure
which are far from corresponding with the actual operation of the system. The
book under review illustrates both these features in a varied collection of articles
from magazines and newspapers, extracts from parliamentary debates and other
public speeches, official reports, newspaper editorials and other sources.
Relatively little of the book is devoted to the construction of the British
North America Act, 1867, the only Canadian state document which bears even a
general resemblance to what in the United States would be called a constitution.
Chapter IX, Dominion-ProvincialRelations, contains a small selection of leading
cases relating to the distribution of legislative power between the Dominion and
the provinces-one phase of constitutional law which in any federal system obviously must be defined by a written instrument. Whether a particular statute is
intra vires or ultra vires (the words "constitutional" and "unconstitutional" are
not used in Canada in this connection) is decided by the courts as the occasion
arises. Generally speaking, however, other questions dealt with in the book do
not turn upon any express provision of the British North America Act or of any
other document, and nevertheless some account is given of most of the constitutional issues (in the sense of questions relating to the conventions or usages of
the constitution) which arose in the first thirty-one years of the present century.
The book affords an exceedingly useful record and reminder of controversies and
developments of which Canadians have been interested spectators, even when they
have not participated in them or studied them as experts.
Even citizens of the United States live with apparent equanimity under a
constitution which is not always construed to mean what it says. One has only
to think of the system of election of the President of the United States by a
college of electors as contemplated by the constitution, transformed in practice so
that the members of the electoral college have become mere automata for giving
effect to the popular vote in each state; and that popular vote has in turn been in
effect limited to a choice between two candidates chosen by the representatives of
the two great political parties respectively. At least it may be said that the actual
system under which citizens of the United States live is less at variance with the
letter of the constitution than the actual system under which Canadian citizens
live is at variance with the letter of the constitution (if one may speak of the
"letter" of an unwritten constitution).
Every statute of the Parliament of Canada is enacted by His Majesty "by
and with the consent" of the Senate and House of Commons. Executive authority in Canada, and the command of the naval and military forces of Canada, are
alike vested in His Majesty; and His Majesty's representative, the GovernorGeneral, may appoint senators and judges, may summon and call together the
House of Commons, and may dissolve it. These and many other things we learn
from the British North America Act, and the forms continue to be faithfully
observed. In fact legislation is enacted by the Senate and the House of Commons, and the personal views of His Majesty or his representative are never pub(878)
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licly asserted to the extent of the refusal of the royal assent. In fact the executive government is carried on by the King's Prime Minister for Canada and a
"cabinet" of ministers chosen by the Prime Minister, who must at all times when
Parliament is in session be able to secure a favourable vote of the House of Commons. Similar observations might be made as to the exercise of legislative power
and executive authority in each province. Of all this the British North America
Act says nothing.
Each chapter of the book under review begins with an appropriate quotation
from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland or from Through the Looking-Glass and
a short introduction by the editor.
Chapter I is entitled The Constitution, and is subdivided under the headings
The Unwritten Constitution and Constitutional Amendment and Development.
An interesting example of the subjects discussed in this chapter is the question of
the amendment of the British North America Act. Being an Act of the British
Parliament, the statute did not need to provide for its own amendment and contains no provision for that purpose. It could of course be amended by the British
Parliament, as a matter of law, without any one else's consent, but as a matter
of constitutional usage the British Parliament has amended the statute only at the
request of Canada. In 1876 objection was taken in the Canadian House of Commons to any amendment of the British North America Act being made by the
British Parliament, even at the request of the Canadian government, without the
previous assent of the Parliament of Canada, and it was suggested that the individual provinces might have to be consulted. More recently the "compact theory"
of confederation has been advocated and elaborated in support of the view that
the assent of the provinces should be obtained before the statute is further
amended. In these circumstances, when by the Statute of Westminster, 1931, the
power of the Parliament of Canada to enact legislation repugnant to legislation of
the Parliament of the United Kingdom was recognized, the repeal or amendment
of the British North America Act was, at Canada's request, expressly excepted,
so as, in effect, to leave this particular matter in statu quo. The importance of
the matter at the present moment is emphasized by the statements made by the
Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the iith and 13th of April, 1934,
suggesting (i) that some rearrangement of the distribution of powers between
Dominion and provinces is essential to enable the Dominion adequately to legislate with regard to social services of nation-wide scope, and (2) that while from
the legal standpoint the request of the Parliament of Canada would be sufficient
to procure an amendment of the British North America Act, from the political
standpoint any change which might infringe upon the rights of the provinces
which were parties to the confederation compact would require careful consideration.
Chapter II is entitled The Governtor-General. After some account of The
Governor-Generalbefore the War ("Once," said the Mock Turtle at last, with a
deep sigh, "I was a real Turtle"), nearly twenty pages are devoted to the constitutional crisis of 1926, arising out of Lord Byng's refusal to grant a dissolution
to the Liberal Prime Minister (as to which the editor uses language which is
perhaps not in keeping with the impartiality of his observations on other controversial topics), and the chapter ends with The Governor-General Today, acting
under new forms of letters patent, instructions and commission prepared in accordance with the report of the Imperial Conference of 193o. The present
incumbent of the office was appointed in 1931 by His Majesty on the advice of
his Prime Minister for Canada.
It is of course the responsibility of the executive branch of the government
to the elected legislative chamber which is usually regarded as the chief distinguishing feature of the constitutions of all the republican kingdoms which are
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members of the British Empire (as well as the constitution of the French Republic), and which affords such a striking contrast with the constitution of the
monarchical republic of the United States and the constitutions of the Central and
South American republics. While the contrast just mentioned remains broadly
true, yet in actual practice the situation is of course not so simple. In Canada the
House of Commons may in theory compel the resignation of the cabinet at any
time, but in practice if any party is in a substantial majority in the House of
Commons, party cohesion is sufficiently strong to prevent a vote adverse to the
cabinet, and it is the cabinet which in effect dominates the House, and not the
House the cabinet. General statements are, however, likely to give a misleading
impression of a complex situation, and a useful corrective is afforded by the
contents of Chapters III and VIII. The former, entitled The Cabinet (the Lion
and the Unicorn fighting for the Crown-"and the best of the joke," said the
King, "is that it's my crown all the while") deals with topics such as cabinet
unity and joint responsibility, the functions of the prime minister and the relations of the cabinet and Parliament. Chapter VIII, entitled Political Parties,is
a long chapter which begins with a reference to Tweedledum and Tweedledee,
and is devoted to such topics as party platforms, the lack of distinguishing features in Canadian political parties, the selection of a party leader, relation of
party leaders to party platform or party policy, and revolts against the old parties.
There are also chapters, which can only be mentioned here, on The House of
Commons, The Senate, The Civil Service, and The Judiciary.
Altogether the book is an admirable collection of documents, official and
unofficial. On some topics a reader would have been glad to have more material,
but that is only saying that the book is not exhaustive. It would be difficult to
make a better selection within the space of less than 500 pages. We cannot properly complain, though we may regret, that the book is not a bigger one.
John D. Falconbridge.
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto.

CASES ON CRIMINAL LAw

(Third Edition). By William E. Mikell. West

Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1933.

Pp. 736.

Price: $5.00.

Professor Mikell's first casebook on Criminal Law was published in 1903.
In 19o8 he published the first edition of his Cases on Criminal Law in the American Casebook Series, containing 597 pages of case materials. The second edition, grown to 788 pages of cases, appeared in 1925. Apparently unwilling
to make his casebook uncoverable in the traditional time allotted to Criminal
Law, he now gives us the third edition, contracted to 736 pages of text and
notes, an editorial accomplishment seldom achieved in new editions of casebooks. The number of chapters in his analysis has remained almost constant
throughout the three editions, with twenty-one in the first, twenty in the second,
and twenty-one in the third. Some forty-five cases in the second edition are
omitted in the third, as compared with about thirty new cases added in the latter. Twenty-two of the thirty added cases were decided after publication of
the former edition in 1925, and all of the thirty are American cases except four,
which are English. The text of the book contains some four hundred cases in
all. About eighty of these, or twenty per cent. of the total, have been decided
since 19oo, thirty-four since 1920. A half dozen are as recent as 1932, and one
was decided in 1933, the year of publication. These new cases are embellished
with adequate notes.
Two of the new cases are inserted in the chapter on Conspiracy, and introduce modern problems not illustrated in the former edition, viz., white slave
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traffic under the Mann Act,' and the matter of smuggling Chinese into the
United States in violation of the Immigration Laws. 2 Two 1932 cases introduce problems under Prohibition,-one 3 the matter of entrapment under the
Eighteenth Amendment, occupying eleven pages, and garnished with the citation of many kindred cases and some law review articles, the other 4 being a
case of murder by a national prohibition officer in the State of Virginia. Four
of the new cases concern the now ubiquitous automobile, presenting the problems of aggravated assault with an automobile,' using a motor vehicle without
authority," larceny of automobile license plates,7 and the automobile stealing
racket.8 The one 1933 case 9 is an indictment for attempting to secure money
by false pretenses against a fake physician treating patients in absentia.
Although Professor Mikell does not divide the book into parts, the contents lend themselves logically to division into four parts. Part I would include
Chapters I, 2 and 3, dealing respectively with Sources of the Crimnal Law, state
and federal, The Nature of Crime, showing what kinds of acts were regarded
as punishable at common law, and the Elements of Crime, or act and intent.
Part II would include specific crimes, Chapters 4 to 17, inclusive. Part III
would contain Chapters 18, 19 and 20, entitled, respectively, Defenses Involving the Mens Rea, Defenses in Justification or Excuse of the Act, and Privileged Acts. Part IV would have only the one remaining Chapter, entitled
Combinations of Persons in Crime. Specific crimes claim the lion's share of
attention in this casebook, fourteen of the twenty-one chapters, and nearly 5oo
of the 763 pages, being devoted to illustration of Assault, Battery and Mayhem,
Rape, Homicide, Larceny, Embezzlement, Cheats and False Pretenses.Receizing
Stolen Property, Burglary, Arson, Forgery, Libel, Perjury,Attempts, and Conspiracy, in order.
There are no cases on Criminal Procedure in the book.' 0
The most noteworthy change in this edition is not the addition of the new
cases, or the omission of certain old ones, nor even the modernization of the
notes, but rather the new arrangement of chapters, and of cases within the chapters. Perhaps more of the old cases should have been omitted. Certainly more
of the recent cases might well have been included. Certainly, also, the amplification of the old notes with new case citations and law review articles might well
have been more extensive. But the writer has only praise for what he regards
as Professor Mikell's prime achievement in the new edition-the new ordering
of his materials throughout the book.
In the first place the treatment of specific crimes, including logically, it
would seem, Attempts, and Conspiracy, is placed well over toward the first of
the book, beginning within the first IOO pages, and following only the three
introductory chapters dealing with Sources of the Criminal Law, The Nature
of Crime, and The Elements of Crime-act and intent. Specific crimes thus
precede such matters as Defenses, Parties, etc. In the previous edition specific

IAt page 557.
- At

Gebardi v. United States, 287 U. S. 112, 53 Sup. Ct. 35 (1932).

page 56o. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915).

'At page 666. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 53 Sup. Ct. 210 (1932).
'At page 678. Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 55 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
'At page 1O2. Brimhall v. State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927).
'At page 82. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 252 Mass. 241, 147 N. E. 552 (1925).
7

At page 384.

Cowan v. State, 171 Ark. l18, 287 S. W. 201 (1926).

'At page 276. Jarrott v. State, io8 Tex. Cr. 427, 1 S. W. (2d) 619 (1928).
'At page 527. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167 At. 344 (Pa. 1933).
" Professor Mikell published some years ago a casebook on Criminal Procedure, and
also an abridged edition of the same, both in the American Casebook Series.
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crimes made up the final chapters of the book. The editor points out in his
preface that "most defenses are valid when, and only when, they negative some
element of the crime charged", and that it does not seem logical in the study
of cases, at least, to have the student "study the defense in connection with a
crime before he knows what the elements of the crime itself are". The writer
agrees with Professor Mikell when he says he "believes

. . . that the student

will get a more orderly and clearer knowledge of the subject by mastering the
elements of the various crimes before studying matters of defense".
Sufficient material for the preparation of the student for the study of the
specific crimes seems to be incorporated in the first three chapters. And one
should find little fault with the order of presentation of these specific crimes,
the space devoted to each, or with the selection of cases in illustration of each
one. The various grades of assault are presented first, Assault, Battery and
Mayhem, then Rape, and finally Homicide. After the assaults comes Larceny,
followed immediately by the related crimes of Embezzlement, False Pretenses,
and Receiving Stolen Property. Then come Burglary, Arson, Forgery, Likel,
and Perjury, and finally Attempts, and Conspiracy, both of which were treated
in the second edition as illustrations of The Sufficiency of the Act. Specific
crimes included in that edition but not retained in the third, are False Imprisment and Kidnapping, and Abortion, the three cases thereunder being omitted
entirely.
It would be tedious to trace all the other interesting changes in arrangement
of the chapters. As a type we may notice what happened to Chapter II of the
second edition on The Nature of Crinw. There were three divisions of this
chapter: i, The Public Injury, consisting of seven sections; 2, Effect of Consent, Condonation, etc., consisting of five sections; and 3, Effect of Coercion,
not sectionized. Division i with its seven sections remains intact both in text
and notes, being Chapter 2 of the third edition. Divisions 2 and 3 disappear
as such, and of the section topics Consent, Negligence of the Person Injured,
Guilt of the Person Injured, Condonation, Custom, Coercion, all except Consent
reappear as section topics in Chapter 19, entitled Defenses in Justification or
Excuse of the Act, with a new section, Entrapment, added to complete the chapter. The 21 pages of cases under Consent are distributed among various chapters. State v. Beck,'1 Bartell v. State, 2 and State v. Allison,," are placed under
Assault, Battery and Mayhem. Speiden v. State, 4 and State v. Abley, 5 are
added to the Burglary cases, etc., six of the cases being among those omitted
entirely.
A glance at the chapter on Larceny, the longest in the book, shows how little the materials generally have been altered in the third edition. Two 1928
cases, one from Florida, 0 and one from Texas,' 7 are inserted under Caption and
Asportation. A 1919 Missouri case '8 and a 1932 Connecticut case '0 are inserted under The Trespass, while a 1927 New York case 2 ousts one of the
vintage of 1898 under the same topic. Finally a 1932 Pennsylvania Superior
nAt page io8. i Hill 363 (S. C. 1833).
=At page lO9. io6 Wis. 342, 82 N. W. 142 (igoo).
aAt page iO. 24 S. D. 622, 124 N. W. 747 (91o).
'At page 468. 3 Tex. App. 156 (,877).
At page 470. 1o9 Iowa 61, 8o N. W. 225 (1899).
"At page 274. Driggers v. State, 96 Fla. 232, II8 So. 20 (1928).
At page 276. Jarrott v. State, lo8 Tex. Cr. 427, I S. W. (2d) 61g (1928).
319. State v. Britt, 278 Mo. 510, 213 S. W. 425 (1919).
IAt
page 324. State v. Rapsey, 115 Conn. 540, 162 Atl. 262 (1932).
"At page 353. People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927).
'7

"At page

BOOK REVIEWS

Court case 2 is added under The Animus Furandi. Thus it is seen that in the
Larceny chapter only six cases have been added and one omitted.
Judged by the standard cf other recent Criminal Law casebooks, Professor
Mikell appears rather niggardly with his notes. They are now numbered consecutively throughout a chapter instead of case by case as before. The new
notes are mostly on the new cases, with now and then an addition, or even subtraction, made in an old note. Legal periodicals were not cited in the former
editions, and are all too sparsely added in the third. Somewhat extended instances of such new citations will be found in the notes under Homicide 2 on
the "causal relation in general", under Attempts, - 3 and under Insanity.-4 There

are no citations to books and articles generally in the notes, nor is there a table
of cited articles, such as one commonly finds in recent casebooks in this and
other fields.
The table of cases seems complete and more free from omissions and
errors than that in the preceding edition. The index in the back of the book
is carefully compiled.
No functional approacher, Professor Mikell has here pursued the even
tenor of the plan mapped out in the former editions so far as concerns the nature and general quality of the materials chosen for treatment. He continues
primarily to develop the topics historically, presenting a sort of moving picture
of the evolution from its common law sources of the criminal law of today.
This he has done admirably. A better selection of cases for the purpose would
be difficult to make and one can find little to criticize in either the ordering or
editing of the cases and of the excerpts from Bracton, Britton, Coke, Hale,
Blackstone, et al. For the teacher who wishes to present the Law of Crimes
of today in its historical setting, not caring to delve deeply into criminology or
penology, or who is willing to gather his own materials therefor, Professor
Mikell's third edition should prove an excellent medium of instruction. He
would likely provoke no quarrel with the editor except perhaps as to the meagerness of the notes, which has already been pointed out. Certainly the writer
knows of no collection of cases on Criminal Law which is more interesting and
more generally satisfactory for purposes of instruction.
Paul E. Bryan.
Lamar School of Law, Emwry University.
EssAYs oN TORT AND CRIME. By Nicholas St. John Green. George Banta Publishing Co., Menasha, 1933. Pp. vii, 220.

In the compilation of the writings of Mr. Green, the publishers have made
little effort toward any grouping of such writings into related subjects. In fact,
the nature of the articles which go to make up the volume renders such grouping a practical impossibility. Such articles might well be divided into fout
classifications: law review articles, of which there are three; law review articles commenting upon treatises and texts of various writers, of which there are
five; text notes to the eighth edition of Story on Agency, of which there are
five; and notes to cases of current interest, of which there are fourteen.
Upon examination of the writings of this author, the reader is immediately
impressed with his simplicity of style, with the total absence of words of ambiguous meaning and of technical phraseology. His language is clear, simple and
direct.
"

SAt page 376. Commonwealth v. Deibert, io6 Pa. Super. 497, 163 At. 68
At page 168.

2At page 537.
21At page 611.

(1932).
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In the treatment of the various subjects upon which he has written, the
author has confined himself to a discussion of the general state of the law as
of the time when he wrote, and has made no effort at foisting his own theories
upon his readers, nor has he attempted any involved discussion of the subjects
at hand. It may be said that, insofar as he has purported to go, the writer has
done a very excellent piece of work in each of his articles and notes. In Proxintate and Remote Cause, for example, there is no attempt at citation of cases,
the involved factual situations of which render the application of the doctrine
difficult, but he has confined his entire discussion to the one thought that there
must be a clear conception of the meaning of proximate as distinguished from
remote, in the legal sense, before there can be any clear understanding of the
doctrine. Again, in the article dealing with Married Womwn, the writer has
made no effort to discuss in any detail the doctrines prevailing with reference
to the rights, duties, privileges and disabilities of such, but has confined himself
to an explanation of the historical reasons for the present state of the law. He
concludes with the prophecy that in the married women property acts, recently
enacted, the first step toward legal recognition of married women may be seen,
but confines himself to that simple statement, and makes no prediction as to the
probable course which future acts of similar nature will take.
In dealing with Slander and Libel and The Three Degrees of Negligence,
the writer has again confined himself almost entirely to a discussion of those
subjects from the historical viewpoint and, while pointing out the difficulties
which the recognized doctrines give rise to, explains such on the basis of the
historical development of those subjects. He expresses disagreement with the
view that there are three degrees of negligence, explaining the origin of the
doctrine on the basis that it arose from a misconception of the meaning of
words used by writers of the Roman Law.
The article on Torts Under the French Law develops into a comparison of
the common law doctrine with that of the French, particularly with reference
to proximate causation, in the law of Torts. The writer has indiscriminately
intermingled the common law cases with those arising in France under the
French law and, for clarity of meaning, the line between the two, in the discussion of the cases, should have been more clearly drawn. The article is most
comprehensive in the variety of subjects and doctrines discussed, but there is
no detailed discussion of any, with the exception of those where the question
of proximate cause is involved.
Without attempting any detailed discussion of each of the articles comprising the volume, it may be said generally that the writer has shown a thoroughness for detail in each of the articles. Particularly good is his historical
treatment of the various topics which he has undertaken to treat from that viewpoint, and several of his articles will be of interest chiefly on account of such
treatment. In none do we find the extensive collection of cases and comment
thereon such as is common to the majority of the articles of similar nature
written today, and his discussion is usually confined to a statement of the
present state of the law, with no attempt to go into any detailed criticism or
comment. Seemingly, the author has meant to confine himself to fundamentals,
and to omit technicalities, ramifications and hair-splittings, in his treatment of
the subject matter of the articles which comprise this book.
The collection of the articles of this author in this volume will prove of
value to those who are in search of historical explanations and developments
of the doctrines set forth in certain of the articles contained therein, and those
who desire a general statement of the fundamental principles relative to the
subjects the author of these articles has discussed.
J. M. McFadden.
University of Georgia School of Law.
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176o-I776. By Charles
F. Mullett. Columbia University Press, New York, 1933. Pp. 216. Price:
$3.00.
To many patient students it has been a matter of interest to discover what
was in the minds of those who, in the decade or more of argument which preceded the Revolutionary War, supported resistance to the authority of Great
Britain. As a result of such labors it has now become common knowledge that
there was a progress or development in the colonial argument, which evolved
from attacks on individual measures, such as the Writs of Assistance or the
Stamp Act, to the deeper denial of the right, first, of any taxation and, afterward, of any legislation for the colonies, on the part of the British Parliament;
and which ultimately, by denouncing the power of the Crown, prepared the way
for independence. In this progress of dialectic the exponents of the colonial
position, wishing to deny the plenary power of Parliament, drew very largely
on English history and English law-for the most part, of an earlier day. But,
apart from English legal precedents, and the early experience of the colonies,
the great refuge of the colonial advocates came to be the doctrine that there was
a law over and above that of Parliament, a law which they generally spoke of
as the law of nature. This idea of a law superior to that of the statute-making
body has been the subject of a vast literature, covering in its sweep the whole
history of thought of the western world. To show how this concept of a
superior or, as he calls it, "fundamental" law, was used by the writers of the
Revolutionary epoch is the goal which Dr. Mullett has set for himself in the
volume now under consideration.
Beginning with a discussion of the continental, English and colonial sources,
Dr. Mullett when he reaches the period of the Revolution considers in three
chapters fundamental law, first, in its relation to taxation and personal rights;
secondly, in connection with the plea for exclusive internal legislation; and
lastly, with reference to the demand for an "equality of status" in the British
Empire. That these chapters follow a certain rough chronological order appears
from the fact that, of the more important leaders of thought, James Otis, Samuel Adams and Daniel Dulany, the younger, are discussed in the first; John
Dickinson in the second; and James Wilson and Thomas Jefferson in the third.
But, as not only these worthies but many of their lesser contemporaries expressed themselves on more than one aspect of the argument, there is produced
an effect of repetition which is at times confusing. As the ground has been
gone over so often, there lies upon the author some necessity for justifying another treatment of this period: and this is found in his effort at inclusiveness.
He has made a diligent search in the pamphlet literature of the Revolutionary
period; indeed, it is, we hope, not unkind to say that the very number of persons of whom Dr. Mullett undertakes to write in the slightly more than one
hundred pages of these three chapters is so large as to render inevitable in many
cases an impression of tenuosity. Even when he discusses a writer so important as James Wilson, the compression is so great that the points which were
distinctive in Wilson's arguments are not clearly differentiated from those which
were frequently stated by others. Moreover, the endeavor to follow the work
of each individual prevents any systematic constructive presentation in one place
of the value of the natural rights philosophy to the statesmen of the Revolution. To the reviewer it appears that Dr. Mullett's treatise would have been
greatly improved by a concluding chapter devoted to this end.
Dr. Mullett's bibliography, at first sight impressive, reveals, upon closer
examination, some limitations. The continental writers seem to be somewhat
overstressed, in view of the fact that their influence is summed up in just twenty
pages of the text; and the citation of "Augustine, City of God (Edinburgh,
i919), 2 vols." would seem to need a slight elaboration. It is to be suspected
FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
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that "Scotus" in the title of George Buchanan's work, De Jure Regni, should
be "Scotos". Thomas Burnet appears in this spelling of his name in the text
and in the index, but as Burnett in the bibliography and in a footnote. One
writing of the Fortescue of the eighteenth century, cited in the footnotes, is not
listed in the bibliography; nor are the works of William Molyneux there to be
found. Among the "Colonial Official Records, Etc." one does not find Hening,
Statutes, and in the "Colonial Collected Writings, Pamphlets, Correspondence,"
the work of the elder Daniel Dulany is cited not quite correctly as to title, while
the place of publication was not Baltimore, but Annapolis. The list of secondary
authorities gives less occasion for criticism.
St. George L. Sioussat.
University of Pennsylvania.

BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY.

By Henry Campbell Black.

Third Edition by the

Publisher's Editorial Staff. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1933.
1944.

Pp. viii,

Price: $6.50.

The preceding editions of this well known law dictionary were published in
1891 and 191o. The present volume is much more than a mere reprint of the
second edition: new words have been included, old definitions have been altered,
and many additional citations to cases containing illustrations of uses of defined
words or terms have been inserted. Despite the fact that this third edition is not
the product of the original editor, the standard of the earlier editions has been
preserved. The book is compact, handy, well bound and printed, and contains a
minimum of typographical errors. A sampling of the definitions, i. e., the first
word or phrase on every tenth page, in this and other works of similar scope reveals no marked variation in the merits of the respective volumes.
A number of defects, however, common to all of the law dictionaries examined, including the one under review, did appear. In the first place they entrench
far too much upon the province of the English dictionary. Law dictionaries
should be limited to words or terms which are peculiar to the legal vocabulary or
which have a lay definition that does not adequately describe their legal usage. A
random turning of the pages of Black's Law Dictionary discloses scores of words
such as alehouse, aristocracy, chain, double, gentlewoman, monogram, prelate,
which would seem to have no proper place in a law dictionary for the reason that,
judged even by the standard of the editor's own definition or discussion, they have
no particular legal significance. One suspects that there may be a commercial
reason behind the padding of "law" dictionaries with such words. Possibly a
tome of modest dimensions such as Frederic J. Stimson's concise little dictionary
of less than 350 pages cannot be sold as readily as the expansive modern one-volume law dictionaries which, while appearing to be more comprehensive, may have
little additional utility to the discriminating user.
In the second place these dictionaries attempt to define many words such as
title, property, possession, negligence, fraud, which defy definition because they
are employed in legal terminology in a variety of senses for a variety of purposes.
Such words are used sometimes to denote facts, at other times to connote legal'
consequences, and only when they appear as terms in propositions can one intelligently discuss whether their usage is accurate, that is, convenient or feasible for
the purpose of conveying the desired thought. Accuracy of usage in this sense
is a matter of feeling which comes with experience and cannot be demonstrated
by an examination of such terms in vacuo. With respect to such words the greatest service a law dictionary could render to the student is to warn him against attempting to arrive at a concise crystallized definition for the reasons above
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advanced. Deluding or encouraging the student in the belief that words of this
ilk are definable in the conventional sense is to hinder rather than to advance his
legal training. Perhaps it is not too much to hope that some day there may appear
an honest law dictionary not replete with commonplace words, in which the editor
does not hesitate to discuss where definition is fatuous.
Alexander Hamilton Frey.
University of Pennsylvania.
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